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ABSTRACT

We provide evidence regarding the relationship between director training programs and improved financial reporting. Director Training Programs (DTP) help directors better understand the
specific context in which a firm operates, including its operations and environment; awareness of
business norms and values; standards of probity and accountability; and their fiduciary duties as
an agent of investors. This study explores a recent requirement for director training and its effect
on the quality of financial reporting for publicly listed companies in three eastern countries. This
study examines the relationship between DTP and the quality of financial reporting of Australian,
Malaysian and Pakistani publicly listed companies by using a sample of data from 2011 to 2013.
We determined that Australian companies that incur additional DTP expenditures and have a
flexible training schedule (Online DTP)improve their financial reporting quality and that a wellestablished DTP positively affects financial reporting quality in Malaysia. In addition, the results
indicate that firm size negatively affects financial reporting quality in the Asia Pacific and older
companies (firm age) suffer from low-quality financial reporting.
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Introduction
Recent accounting scandals in the international financial community have raised many concerns regarding
the quality of periodical financial disclosures (Agrawal
& Chadha, 2005; Bowen, Call, & Rajgopal, 2010).
Several prominent companies have suffered from accounting fraud and incompetent management, including Enron, WorldCom, HIH Insurance, and Parmalat,
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which has weakened principals’ (investors) confidence
in Agents (directors)and the eminence of financial reports (Beekes & Brown, 2006; Brown & Caylor, 2006;
Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005;
Petra, 2007). Now, more than ever before, directors
must understand their fiduciary, legal and ethical responsibilities because the bar has been raised. Investors’ confidence in corporations has reached an alltime low, and the role of directors has become even
more challenging and demanding (Bowen et al., 2010;
Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Grossman & Haskisson, 1998;
Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005;). According to Sloan
(2001), financial information is the first source of independent and factual communication regarding the
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performance of a company and its directors, which
makes financial reporting a primary indicator of management’s control and proficiency.
Doh (2003) suggests that individuals can be taught
how to engage in effective board leadership and systematic training programs affect organizations’ leadership strategies (Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996; Dvir,
Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002). Parry and Sinha (2005)
investigate the effects of training and report a significant
increase in leadership strategies and a significant effect
on performance through the enhancement of transformational strategies (Dvir et al., 2002). In addition,
leadership training significantly affects self-reported
employee variables such as employee commitment
(Barling et al., 1996) follower development (Dvir et al.,
2002), satisfaction with leadership (Hassan, Fuwad, &
Rauf, 2010) extra follower effort (Parry & Sinha, 2005)
and certain objective performance measures (Barling et
al., 1996). However, the impact of director training programs on the financial reporting quality is not well understood. Recently, the association between leadership
characteristics and financial reporting quality has been
discussed in developed countries. Emphasis was placed
on specific governance mechanisms including insider
domination of shareholding (Yeo, Tan, Ho, & Chen,
2002;), board independence (Beekes, Pope, & Young,
2004; Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, 2006; Petra, 2007), director shareholding (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca,
2007) and the reputation of the auditing firm (Agrawal
& Chadha, 2005). Recent studies have analyzed board
attributes and financial reporting quality in rapidly
growing emerging economies that have distinctive features of corporate control, capital allocation and regulations (Bradbury et al., 2006; Dimitropoulos & Asteriou,
2010; Firth et al., 2007).
Countries around the world are characterized by
their corporate governance systems and scholars debate the efficiency, superiority and effectiveness of
these systems. We use a dataset that includes large
Australian, Malaysian and Pakistani firms; these three
Anglo-Saxon countries have common characteristics
in terms of their basic governance systems (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Prowse
(1992) suggests that judgments are inherently subjective because of sparse evidence regarding the relative performance of different corporate governance
systems. Existing studies have generally examined
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the effects of corporate governance characteristics of
firms that operate in only one country on earnings
management (Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, & Riedl,
2010; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna 2007; Yasser &
Mamun, 2015). In this study, we seek to fill this gap in
the extant literature.
This study seeks to analyze the following question:
Do the director training programs of publically listed
companies affect the quality of their financial reporting? To address this question, we built a dataset by collecting data from the Australian Stock Exchange, the
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and the Pakistan Stock
Exchange. We empirically analyzed the effect of director training programs on earnings management by
examining a sample of matched industrial companies
that are listed on the stock exchanges of the sample
countries. Data were collected from annual reports
and when necessary, these data were complemented
and crosschecked with the corporate websites of the
sample companies. First, we provide a review of prior
empirical studies, which is followed by our hypotheses, the method, the study results, a discussion, and
the conclusion.

Review of Prior Studies and
Hypotheses
Mole (2000) distinguishes between training, education
and development and proposes that training focuses
on the present job, education focuses on a future job,
and development focuses on the organization. Although some of the more traditional modes of provision, particularly for formal management programs,
seek to enhance skills and knowledge and adopt a
training approach, the current trend focuses more on
education and development as indicated by the following statement: “Development programs prepare individuals to move in the new directions that organizational change may require” (Mole, 2000, p. 22).
Professional development is an important topic that
is related to the characteristics of top management
because it is related to distinct patterns of decision
makers’ cognitive processes, attention and final decisions (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). In addition, Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) suggest that managers are
generally engaged in complicated, ambiguous and
information overloaded situations. This implies that
managers operate within a finite model or paradigm
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despite making use of all of the available information.
Long-tenured managers are fixated on this paradigm,
which makes it difficult for them to pay a great deal of
attention to outside sources of information.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that the demographic characteristics of top management including
experience, age, gender and tenure affect their values
and cognitive bases, which subsequently affect their
decision-making and choices, particularly in complex
situations and ultimately result in different organizational outcomes. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) developed an innovative design to determine that managers’ personal characteristics influence their investment
or financial decisions after controlling for firm and
time fixed effects. This methodology has been applied
by other studies, including Bamber, Jiang, and Wang
(2010), which demonstrated that executives’ disclosure
styles are related to their personal backgrounds. These
scholars argue that older executives use a conservative
disclosure style and finance and accounting managers
use a more precise disclosure style.
Although numerous studies have examined whether financial reporting quality is influenced by various governance mechanisms, generally, the empirical
evidence has been mixed (Armstrong et al., 2010). In
addition, prior studies that examine managerial compensation and its impact on financial reporting have
failed to produce consistent results. Furthermore, certain studies have determined that a negative relationship exists between directors’ equity incentives and the
quality of financial reporting (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Efendi, Srivastava,
& Swanson, 2007); however, certain studies were unable to confirm that a relationship exists between directors’ equity incentives and the quality of financial
reporting (Baber, Liang, & Zhu, 2012; Erickson, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2006) and other studies reported that
a positive relationship exists (Armstrong et al., 2010).
Studies that have examined the effects of various
features of boards of directors on financial reporting
have determined that more independent boards are
associated with higher quality reporting (Efendi et al.,
2007; Klein, 2002); however, other studies provided
little evidence that board independence has a significant impact on financial reporting quality (Agarawal
& Chadha, 2005; Kim & Qi, 2010; Larcker et al., 2007).
Although numerous factors may contribute to the
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mixed results that are reported by extant literature,
the joint endogeneity of corporate governance and financial reporting represents perhaps the greatest challenge (Armstrong et al., 2010). In addition, a companies’ selection of a particular governance mechanism
is endogenously determined by numerous factors, including firm fundamental characteristics, information
environments, other governance mechanisms, and
managerial attributes.
Most prior studies regarding the quality of financial reporting have focused on firm characteristics
and other environmental factors (Dechow & Dichev,
2002; Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010). However, agency
theory suggests that decision makers are affected by
contractual incentives and an organization’s monitoring mechanisms and growth (Decker & Calo, 2007;
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998;). Conversely, the upper echelons theory suggests that directors’ demographic characteristics and skills are associated with
their unique cognitive styles and values and affect the
managerial decision-making processes (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Bertrand
and Schoar (2003) documented that executive’s demographic characteristics affect their decision-making
capacity and accounting policies. In addition, Bamber
et al. (2010) and Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010)
suggest that executive-specific fixed effects reflect systematic differences in executives’ disclosure styles and
tax avoidance strategies.
Prior studies propose that executive training can be
used to develop needed competencies and help companies’ strategic personnel to succeed in their specific
organizational contexts (Burke & Hutchins, 2007).
The effectiveness of director training has been studied
from three different perspectives: the effects of training
on attitudinal outcomes of trainees (Howell & Frost,
1989), the effects of training on subordinates’ task performance (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996) and the impact
of training on financial outcomes (Barling et al., 1996).
Studies regarding the impact of training on skill development have demonstrated that this effect is stronger for technical training than more complex types of
managerial training programs and the effects of training are more significant for skills that can be segmented into step-by-step routines than for soft skills (Hunt
& Baruch, 2003). Training could amplify the benefits
of learning routines if regular reviews of performance
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trends are conducted through performance analysis,
problem solving, and oral communication skills. In
addition, training may better leverage discretion by
increasing management’s capacity to diagnose and redesign processes or by facilitating the appropriate use
of targets and incentives to motivate employees (Kim
& Qi, 2010).
Executive training conveys basic information regarding reform and its requirements; simply knowing
more about a reform may encourage employees to implement the reform. This type of declarative knowledge
(information about something) is generally perceived
as inferior to procedural or tacit knowledge (information about how or which, when, and why) (Aguinis &
Kraiger, 2009). However, providing information regarding important reform concepts, changes to central
processes and routines, and expectations and rewards
appear to be related to fundamental lower-order conditions for behavioral change. Prior studies have examined the effects of various features of boards of directors on financial reporting quality, but the results are
mixed. For example, certain studies determined that
directors’ financial expertise is associated with higher
quality reporting (e.g., Klein, 2002; Efendi et al., 2007),
but other studies were unable to confirm that directors’ financial expertise had a significant impact on
the quality of financial reporting (e.g., Agarawal and
Chadha, 2005; Larcker et al., 2007). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
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priate continuing education programs. In addition,
the code of corporate governance should include
the following:
“In a dynamic and complex business environment,
it is imperative that directors devote sufficient time
to update their knowledge and strengthen their skills
through appropriate continuing education programs
and life-long learning. This will enable directors to sustain their active participation in board deliberations.
Director(s) should notify the chairman of the board of
the planned and estimated time that will be spent on
the training and development of new directorship appointments before accepting any new directorship. The
nominating committee is responsible for reviewing the
director’s training program” (Section 4.2).
•

“The board or nomination committee of a listed entity should regularly review whether the directors as a
group have the skills, knowledge and familiarity with
the entity and its operating environment required to
effectively fulfill their role on the board and on board
committees and, where any gaps are identified, consider what training or development could be undertaken to fill those gaps. Where necessary, the entity
should provide resources to help develop and maintain its directors’ skills and knowledge. This includes,
in the case of a director who does not have specialist
accounting skills or knowledge, ensuring that he or she
has a sufficient understanding of accounting matters
to fulfill his or her responsibilities in relation to the
entity’s financial statements. It also ensures that all
directors receive ongoing briefings on developments in
accounting standards” (Section 2.6).

Hypothesis: Director training programs have a positive
impact on financial reporting quality.

Regulatory Framework for Director
Training
A code of corporate governance is the primary regulatory framework for a company according to statutes
that have been enacted to improve the governance
practices of firms that operate in each of the sample
countries. Guidelines for developing code of corporate
governance for promoting Director Training Programs
(DTP) for each of the sample countries are as follows:
•

Malaysia
The Malaysian revised code of corporate governance (2012) recommends that the board of directors ensures that its members have access to appro-

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS

Australia
The Codes of corporate governance that were issued in 2014 focus on DTP and require that each
listed entity have a program for inducting new
directors and providing appropriate professional
development opportunities for directors to develop
and maintain the skills and knowledge that directors need to effectively perform their roles.

•

Pakistan
The revised Codes of corporate governance that
were issued in 2012 specify the requirements for
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Table 1. Selection of Variables
Country

Index

Companies

Percentage

Australia

Australia Stock Exchange

90

33.33%

Malaysia

Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange

90

33.33%

Pakistan

Pakistan Stock Exchange

90

33.33%

270

100.0%

Total Sample Companies (Three Years: 2011 to 2013)

director training programs of locally listed companies by stating the following:
“All listed companies shall make appropriate arrangements to provide orientation courses for their directors
to acquaint them with this code, applicable laws, their
duties and responsibilities to enable them to effectively
manage the affairs of the listed companies for and on
behalf of shareholders. It shall be mandatory for all
the directors of listed companies to be certified by any
directors’ training program offered by institutions—
local or foreign—that meets the criteria as specified by
the SECP. From June 30, 2012 to June 30, 2016, every
year, a minimum of one director on the board shall
obtain the said certification under this program each
year and thereafter, all directors shall obtain it. Furthermore, individuals with a minimum of 14 years of
education and 15 years of experience on the board of a
listed company local and/or foreign shall be exempted
from the directors’ training program” (Section xi).

Research Methodology
The dataset includes a large sample of firms that operate
in multiple sectors (manufacturing, services, agriculture, and construction). We describe our sample selection procedure in Table 1. The primary constraint on our
sample size is the availability of data from 2011 to 2013
for companies that operate in Australia, Malaysia and
Pakistan. The top indexed companies used in this study
were obtained from the Australian Stock Exchange
(AXS), the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and
the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE); 33.3% of the firms
in the sample were obtained from each stock exchange.

Multivariate Regression Models
In the multivariate analysis, we used the absolute
value of the residue of the regression models to mea-
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sure the quality of the accruals. Dechow and Dichev
(2002) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper
(2005) used the standard deviation of errors in the
estimation of accruals to measure the quality of the
accruals; however, we use the absolute value of this
residue. Multivariate regression models were used to
analyze the relationship between DTP and financial
reporting quality as follows:
Financial Reporting Quality =
= AR + PAaccr + TCaccr + AGGRE

(1)

(2)

Dependent, Explanatory and Control
Variables
The variables that are used in our equations are described in Table 2.

Independent Variables
DTP starts (DTPY) refer to the number of year(s),
beginning in 2011, that sample companies offered
director training programs. However, the variable
‘DTP expense’ (DTPX) represents the amount of
money (in USD millions) that the company spent
for the development of the board of directors during the sample year. Because members of the board
members generally have busy schedules, most companies use online DTP. The variable ‘Online DTP’
(Online) represents the status of DTP delivery and
is a dummy variable that is set as “1” as if the DTP
is offline/physical and “0” otherwise. Specific AC is
a variable that indicates the scope of DTP regarding the needs of audit committee members. For this
dummy variable, “1” used if the specific audit committee needs DTP and “0” otherwise.
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Table 2. Definition of Variables
Sr. #

Variables

Description

Independent Variable
(A)

DTPY

DTP Start (Year)

Number of year(s) since DTP was launched for the first time.

(B)

DTPX

DTP Expenses

The amount of DTP expenditures.

(C)

SPAC

Specific Audit Committee Training

Dummy variable and is ‘1’ if there is a specific DTP for Audit
Committee members and ‘0’ otherwise.

(D)

Online

Training Status

Dummy variable and is ‘1’ if the DTP is offline and‘0’ otherwise.

Dependent Variables
Total accruals are measured as the change in non-cash current
assets minus the change in current non-interest bearing liabilities,
minus depreciation and amortization expense, scaled by lagged
total assets.

(E)

PAaccr

Performance Adjusted
Discretionary Accrual

(F)

AR

Discretionary Revenue

The annual change in revenues and scaled by lagged total assets.

(G)

TCaccr

Total Current Accruals

Total current accruals are measured as the change in non-cash
current assets minus the change in current non-interest bearing
liabilities, scaled by lagged total assets.

(H)

Aggre.

Aggregate Accruals

An average of PAaccr, AR and TCaccr.

Control Variables
(I)

FSIZE

Firm Size

The log of total assets

(J)

FL

Financial Leverage

Total Debt/Total Equity

(K)

BI

Board Independence

Percentage of non-executive director in board

(L)

FAGE

Firm Age

Number of years from the incorporation.

Control Variables
Motivated by prior empirical studies, we include firm
size, board independence, financial leverage and firm
age as control variables (Owolabi, Obiakor, & Okwu,
2011; Raheman & Nasr, 2007). To control for firm size,
we included a variable for the natural logarithm of total
assets (FSIZE). Firm age was calculated as the natural
logarithm of the number of years since the incorporation of the firm, which helped to control for the organization’s maturity (Arthurs, Hoskisson, Busentiz, &
Johnson 2008; Matta & Beamish, 2008). The logarithmic form of analysis was applied to reduce heteroscedasticity (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). Hutchinson
and Gul (2004) argued that a firm’s leverage may lead
to increased external control because creditors would
monitor its capital structure more intensively to protect their interests. In alignment with Chen and Jaggi
(2000), the debt-to-equity ratio (FL) was used to measure firm leverage.

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS

Dependent Variables (Proxies for Financial
Reporting Quality)
A solitary universally recognized measure for financial reporting quality has not been developed
(Dechow et al. 2010). This study employs three
measures that have been used in prior studies and
an aggregate measure is included for the following reasons. First, this study focuses on financial
reporting quality, which is multi-dimensional.
Therefore, a single proxy may not include all of
the facets of financial reporting quality. Second,
the use of multiple proxies increases the adequacy
of our results. Third, using alternative measures
mitigates the possibility that results using one particular proxy capture a factor other than financial
reporting quality.
The first measure is performance-adjusted
discretionary accruals as proposed by Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003), Kothari,
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Leone, & Wasley (2005) and Chen, Harford, and
Li (2007).

		

(1)

where, PAaccri,t total accruals is measured as
the change in non-cash current assets minus the
change in current non-interest bearing liabilities,
minus depreciation and amortization expenses
for firm i at year t, scaled by lagged total assets
Revi,t represents the annual change
( Assetsi,t );
in revenues scaled by lagged total assets; PPEi,t

represents property, plant, and equipment for
firm i at year t, scaled by lagged total assets; and
ROAi,t represents return on assets for firm i at
year t. The residuals from the regression model
are discretionary accruals. In our tests, we use
the absolute values of discretionary accruals as a
proxy for financial reporting quality. We multiply
the absolute values of discretionary accruals by
-1. Therefore, higher values of PAaccr represent
higher financial reporting quality.
To calculate the second proxy, we align with
Chen et al. (2007), McNichols and Stubben (2008)
and use the following regression:
(2)
where, ∆ ARi,t represents the annual change in accounts receivable and ∆ Revi,t represents the annual change in revenues, scaled by lagged total
assets. Discretionary revenues are the residuals
from Equation (2) that are estimated separately
for each industry-country group. Our third proxy
is based on the cross-sectional Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Tucker and Zarowin (2006) model, as modified by McNichols (2002), Francis et al.
(2005) and Chen et al. (2007).

(3)
where, TCaccr represents total current accruals,
which are measured as the change in non-cash
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current assets minus the change in current noninterest bearing liabilities, scaled by lagged total
assets; OCF represents cash flow from operations,
which is measured as the sum of net income, depreciation and amortization, and changes in current liabilities, minus changes in current assets,
scaled by lagged total assets; Revi,t represents
the annual change in revenues scaled by lagged
total assets; and PPEi,t represents property, plant,
and equipment, scaled by lagged total assets.
The residuals from Equation (3) represent the
estimation errors in the current accruals that are
not associated with operating cash flows and cannot be explained by changes in revenue and levels of property, plant and equipment. Because of
the short longitudinal time frame that is used in
our study, we align with Srinidhi and Gul (2007)
and Chen et al. (2007) and use the absolute value
of this residual as a proxy for financial reporting
quality. Therefore, higher values of TCaccr represent higher financial reporting quality. To reduce
the measurement errors of the financial reporting quality mechanism and to present evidence
based on general financial reporting metrics, we
aggregate these proxies into one score. In alignment with Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), we
normalize all proxies and then calculate the average of the three measures as our summary financial reporting quality statistic (AGGRE).

Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables that are used in our primary tests. The number
of observations varies with data availability and selection for each dependent variable because we utilize all
available observations for each measure of financial
reporting quality.
The results indicate that the mean value of ‘DTP
Start’ is lowest in Pakistan at 6 years and is 12 years in
Malaysia and 24 years in Australia. However, DTP expenditures are highest in Malaysia with a mean value
of 29.61 million and are 21.23 million in Pakistan and
29 million in Australia, with a minimum expense of
0.20, 2.8 and 10 million in Pakistan, Malaysia and Australia, respectively.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Australia

Malaysia

Pakistan

Min.

Max.

Mean

SD

Min.

Max.

Mean

SD

Min.

Max.

Mean

SD

DTP Start

9.0

36.0

23.85

8.15

3.0

24.0

12.23

4.13

1.0

15.0

5.87

3.71

DTP Expense

10.0

43.0

28.87

6.81

2.8

58.0

29.61

12.11

0.20

170.8

21.23

81.9

Specific AC

0.0

1.0

0.87

0.34

0.0

1.0

0.87

0.34

0.0

1.0

0.66

0.48

Online DTP

0.0

1.0

0.89

0.32

0.0

1.0

0.88

0.33

0.0

1.0

0.83

0.37

Firm Age

11

196

89.64

50.14

3

72

34.13

14.88

1.0

106

40

25.81

Firm Size

3.70

5.91

4.81

0.59

3.14

5.72

4.55

0.63

3.77

6.23

5.03

0.59

BI

0.10

1.00

0.62

0.48

0.00

1.00

0.49

0.59

0.00

1.00

0.39

0.38

FL

0.00

1.21

0.13

0.22

0.01

1.50

0.19

0.34

0.00

2.12

0.32

0.48

AR

0.71

1.10

0.87

0.11

0.86

1.47

1.14

0.15

0.84

1.38

1.07

0.12

Paaccr

1.29

2.31

1.79

0.31

1.37

2.75

1.94

0.32

1.48

2.52

2.02

0.24

Tcaccr

1.46

2.77

2.19

0.37

1.73

2.86

2.35

0.28

1.83

3.47

2.54

0.29

AGGRE

3.65

6.12

4.87

0.76

4.58

6.40

5.43

0.44

4.48

6.76

5.63

0.42

Table 4. Correlation Coefficient Analysis
Variables

1

1.

DTP Start

1

2

3

2.

DTP Expense

0.015

1

3.

Specific Audit
Committee

0.117

0.225**

1

4

5

6

7

4.

Online DTP

-0.070

0.123

0.357**

1

5.

AR

-0.202

-0.088

-0.080

-0.038

1

6.

Paaccr

0.216**

0.091

0.069

-0.019

-0.879**

1

7.

Tcaccr

0.318**

0.128

0.094

-0.034

-0.680**

0.780**

1

8.

AGGRE

0.290**

0.120

0.083

-0.046

-0.715**

0.895**

0.963**

Table 3 indicates that the number of firms that have
specific audit committee training and development is
lowest in Pakistan with a mean value of 0.66; in addition, the trend for online DTP is lowest in Pakistan
with a mean value of 0.83. The firm age is 196 years
for the Australian sample, which is the highest of all
three countries, and the maximum firm age in Malaysia is 72 years.
The correction coefficient analysis results of the
variables are presented in Table 4 below. The results
indicate that starting director training programs (DTP
Start) early is positively correlated with financial re-
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1

porting quality. However, ‘Specific AC’ was not correlated to any of the financial reporting measures. In
addition, the other DTP variables were not correlated
to any of the financial reporting measures.

Regression Results
Tables 5 through 8 report the impact of DTP on the
financial reporting quality of firms that operate in Australia, Malaysia and Pakistan.
Table 5 indicates that the dependent variable AR is
positively associated with starting DTP early in Pakistan and Australia and DTP expenditures in Austra-
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Table 5. AR as the Dependent Variable
Australia

Malaysia

Pakistan

DTP Start

3.70**

-1.72

2.11**

DTP Expenses

3.93**

-0.65

-0.29

Specific DTP for Audit
Committee

-0.54

-0.23

-0.49

Online DTP

2.34**

-0.28

0.78

Firm Age

-1.13

-3.59**

-1.57

Firm Size

-7.08**

-7.66**

-6.63**

Financial Leverage

5.02

6.56

5.98

Board Independence

0.56

0.55

0.75

R²

65.9%

56.7%

38.7%

Adj. R²

62.0%

53.0%

34.3%

F-Statistics

17.03

15.34

8.75

Prob.

0.000

0.000

0.000

Australia

Malaysia

Pakistan

1.92

1.79

-1.23

DTP Expenses

2.79**

0.83

1.08

Specific DTP for Audit
Committee

-1.78

0.27

1.68

Online DTP

3.27**

-0.24

1.97**

Table 6. PAaccr as the Dependent Variable
DTP Start

Firm Age

1.167

-2.44

0.53

Firm Size

-6.43**

-8.25**

-8.91**

Financial Leverage

5.88

5.74

6.59

Board Independence

0.59

0.85

0.66

R²

61.5%

57.1%

51.7%

Adj. R²

57.2%

53.4%

48.2%

F-Statistics

14.13

15.57

14.78

Prob.

0.000

0.000

0.000

lia are positively associated with AR. The results of
the coefficient analysis indicate that the model used
in this study is statistically significant at a level of 5%
(p<0.05).In this study, the R² when AR was the dependent variable was 65.9%, 56.7% and 38.7%, which was
adjusted to better fit the model in the population and
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the final adjusted R² was 62%, 53% and 34.3%, respectively, for Australia, Malaysia and Pakistan.
In addition, the results indicate that firm size is
significantly negatively correlated with the financial
reporting measure “AR” in Australia, Malaysia and
Pakistan. However, Firm age is negatively associated
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Table 7. TCaccr as the Dependent Variable
Australia

Malaysia

Pakistan

DTP Start

1.09

3.05**

-0.34

DTP Expenses

1.89

0.82

0.12

Specific DTP for Audit
Committee

-1.02

0.48

1.71

Online DTP

3.46**

-0.38

0.21

Firm Age

0.99

-4.19**

-0.78

Firm Size

-3.24**

-3.88**

-6.83**

Financial Leverage

4.59

5.15

5.25

Board Independence

0.84

0.67

0.88

R²

46.3%

42.3%

40.6%

Adj. R²

40.2%

37.4%

36.3%

F-Statistics

7.624

8.597

9.450

Prob.

0.000

0.000

0.000

Australia

Malaysia

Pakistan

1.82

2.66**

-0.25

DTP Expenses

2.56**

0.88

0.58

Specific DTP for Audit
Committee

-1.35

0.42

1.96

Online DTP

Table 8. AGGRE as the Dependent Variable
DTP Start

3.47**

-0.49

1.45

Firm Age

0.89

-3.27**

-0.75

Firm Size

-5.20**

-5.57**

-7.58**

Financial Leverage

5.26

5.88

5.65

Board Independence

0.78

1.06

0.89

R²

57.1%

47.1%

45.6%

Adj. R²

52.3%

42.6%

41.6%

F-Statistics

11.76

10.42

11.57

Prob.

0.000

0.000

0.000

with financial reporting quality in Malaysia and the
trend of using online DTP is positively associated with
“AR” in Australia.
Table 6 indicates that the dependent variable PAaccr
is positively associated with DTP expenditures and
Online DTP in Australia. Online DTP is also posi-

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS

tively associated with the quality of financial reporting in Pakistan, and firm size (FSIZE) is negatively
associated with the quality of financial reporting for
all three countries. The results of the coefficient analysis indicate that the model is statistically significant
at a level of 5% (p<0.05). In this study, the R² when

DOI: 10.5709/ce.1897-9254.233

155

Director Training and Financial Disclosure: Asian Insights

AR was the dependent variable was 61.5%, 57.1% and
51.7%, which was adjusted to better fit the model in
the population, and the final adjusted R² was 57.2%,
53.4% and 48.2%, respectively, for Australia, Malaysia
and Pakistan.
Table 7 indicates that the dependent variable TCaccr is positively associated with starting DTP early in
Malaysia and online DTP is positively associated with
financial reporting quality in Australia. In this study,
the R² for the TCaccr dependent variable was 46.3%,
42.3% and 40.6%, which was adjusted to better fit the
model for the population, and the final adjusted R² was
40.2%, 37.4% and 36.3%, respectively, for Australia,
Malaysia and Pakistan.
In addition, the results indicate that firm size is negatively associated with the financial reporting measure
“TCaccr” in Australia, Malaysia and Pakistan. However, Firm age is negatively associated with financial
reporting quality in Malaysia.
Table 8 indicates that the dependent variable AGGRE is positively associated with starting DTP early in
Malaysia and DTP expenditures are positively associated with financial reporting quality (AGGRE) in Australia. The results of the coefficient analysis indicate
that the model of this study is statistically significant
at a level of 5% (p<0.05). In this study, the R² when
AR was the dependent variable was 57.1%, 47.1% and
45.6%, which was adjusted to better fit the model in
the population, and the final adjusted R² was 52.3%,
42.6% and 41.6%, respectively, for Australia, Malaysia
and Pakistan.
In addition, the results indicate that firm size is negatively associated with the financial reporting measure
“AGGRE” in Australia, Malaysia and Pakistan. However, firm age is negatively associated with financial
reporting quality in Malaysia.
Surprisingly, firm size has a negative significant impact of on the quality of financial reporting. However,
these results align with Yasser and Mamun (2015).
Vijayakumar and Tamizhselvan (2010) document
that firm size is related to transparency and firm value in the neoclassical view of a firm; this concept is
referred to as economies of scale. Economies of scale
may occur for various reasons, including financial
reasons (a large firm has more resources to hire top
professionals and consultants with the most advanced
expertise); organizational reasons (specialization and
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division of labor); technical reasons (high fixed costs
can be distributed across a large number of units). In
alignment with this concept, we expect that positive
relationships exist between firm size and firm age and
financial reporting quality. Conversely, a conceptual
framework that advocates a negative relationship between firm size and transparency is noted in alternative theories regarding firms and suggests that large
firms are controlled by managers who pursuing selfinterested goals and therefore, profit maximization as
the firm’s primary function may be replaced by a managerial utility maximization function (Foss, Lando, &
Thomsen, 2000).

Summary and Conclusion
To our knowledge, this study provides the first documented evidence of an association between directors
training programs and measures of accounting quality that explicitly recognizes that a firm’s investment in
accounting and auditing is not independent from one
period to the next. Prior studies have provided conflicting results regarding the extent to which audit fees
are associated with accounting quality (i.e., whether
fees are consistently high or consistently low) and we
can reliably identify instances where a conscious investment was made in more (or less) auditing; however, a director’s impact on the financial reporting quality
was ignored. We argue that the relationship between
measures of accounting quality and measures of unexpected audit fees based on a single period are interpreted by relying on one dimension of agency theory.
The results of this study indicate that companies that
operate in Australia that incur additional expenditures
for DTP and offer flexible training schedules (Online
DTP) report improved financial reporting quality.
However, a long-term director training program positively affects financial reporting quality. These results
are relevant because of the increased attention that
regulators and other market participants have placed
on the importance of director training programs and
development in firm governance. The results may be
of particular interest to regulators, capital market participants and academics. Regulators may be interested
because the results have policy implications when
considering the quality of financial reporting and director development. Investors and creditors may find
the results useful for evaluating investment decisions.
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Finally, academics who seek to broaden their experiences by serving on corporate boards may find the information useful in making decisions regarding their
personal development.
The results of the analysis demonstrate that firm size
and firm age negatively affect the quality of financial
reporting. There are several possible reasons for this
influence. Because of their market power, larger and
older firms are able to charge higher prices and subsequently earn higher profits. In addition, higher profits
could result from economies of scale and stronger negotiating power that provides larger firms with more
favorable financing conditions. In addition to inflexible organization structures and technology, a change
in the strategic logic that is used by firms (it became
more important to survive during a global economic
crisis than to increase profitability) may explain the
weak relationships between firm size and firm age and
reporting quality.
This study contributes to the extant literature in
three dimensions: first, this study combines marketbased and standard accounting financial indicators as
measures of financial reporting to test the predictions
of agency theory. Second, this study provides new empirical evidence regarding the effects of director training programs on a firm’s financial reporting quality in
all sectors of the Asia Pacific stock markets. Finally,
this study provides additional evidence regarding the
effect of director training on financial reporting in developed and developing countries by using the same
variables and analysis techniques.
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